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IN THE PROSECUTOR WE TRUST?  A CASE AGAINST 
PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT INTO THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Gray v. Netherland,1 Coleman Wayne Gray and Melvin Tucker 
followed Richard McClelland,2 the store manager of Murphy’s Mart in 
Portsmouth, Virginia, with the intent to rob him and the store.3  While high on 
cocaine the pair forced McClelland into their car and subsequently took 
$13,000 from Murphy’s Mart.4  They then drove McClelland to a remote area 
and shot5 him six times in the back of the head with a .32-caliber weapon.6 
The bodies of Lisa Sorrell and her three-year-old daughter Shanta were 
found in Sorrell’s burned car in Chesapeake, Virginia, approximately five 
months before Gray was charged with the capital murder of McClelland.7  
Sorrell had been shot in the head six times with a .32-caliber weapon.8  Gray 
was never charged with the Sorrell murders.9 
In the sentencing phase of Gray’s capital trial, the prosecution put Melvin 
Tucker, who was testifying against Gray in exchange for a lesser sentence, on 
the stand to testify that Gray told him “he had ‘knocked off’ Lisa Sorrell.”10  
Gray denied any involvement in the Sorrell murders.11  The only direct 
connection between Gray and the Sorrell murders was Tucker’s statement.12  
In closing argument, however, the prosecution discussed the similarities 
between the two murders and argued that he should be sentenced to death for 
the threat of future violence.13  After being exposed to gruesome, detailed 
 
 1. 518 U.S. 152 (1996). 
 2. McClelland had also recently fired Gray’s wife. Id. at 155-156. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Gray claimed that Tucker was the person who pulled the trigger.  Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gray, 518 U.S. at 155-156. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 166-67. 
 11. Id. at 175. 
 12. Id. at 176-177 
 13. Gray, 518 U.S. 176-177. 
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evidence about the murders of Sorrell and her baby daughter, the jury 
sentenced Gray to death.14 
The problem, as Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissenting opinion, was that 
there was much evidence linking Lisa Sorrell’s husband, Timothy Sorrell, to 
the murders.15  In fact, the police’s number one suspect had been Timothy 
Sorrell throughout its investigation.16  Lisa Sorrell felt discontent about 
Timothy Sorrell’s involvement in the sale of stolen goods.17  Timothy, in 
speaking to his friends at a party the night before the murders, revealed that he 
had a .32 caliber weapon.18  Timothy also made several statements to friends 
about his desire for his wife to be killed.19  Additionally, the family 
suspiciously purchased a life insurance policy for Lisa two weeks before the 
murders in which Timothy and baby Shanta were named as the beneficiaries. 20  
Gray’s defense counsel was not given enough time to discover this 
information, thus the jury never heard any of this evidence.21 
Melvin Tucker remains in prison for the McClelland murder.22  Since his 
part in the sentencing phase of Gray’s trial, Tucker has admitted that “his 
testimony about Gray’s admission that he killed the two women was false.”23 
On Wednesday February 26, 1997 at 8.55 p.m., “Gray walked trembling 
into Virginia’s execution chamber . . . and was strapped to the gurney [sic] by 
guards. Once injected, he lifted his head, looked from left to right and began 
breathing heavily. He made no last statement.”24  Gray stopped breathing at 
9:04 p.m.25 
Many states allow evidence of unadjudicated conduct in the sentencing 
phase of capital trials.  “[B]ecause there is no level of proof which must be 
established, there is no way to know whether the alleged conduct even 
occurred.”26  The objective of this article is to show the many fallacies with 
allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital 
trials.  As long as the United States continues to allow capital punishment, it 
should do everything in its power to assure that its implementation is as fair 
and impartial as possible.  For this reason, the Supreme Court should rule 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Gray, 518 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Stay of Execution Denied for Coleman Gray, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 22, 1977, at 
B3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 65-66 (1999). 
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against allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct into the sentencing phase of 
capital trials and finally unify the states on this issue.  Even if the Supreme 
Court does not decide on such a case, the Missouri Supreme Court should 
decide not to allow this evidence into the sentencing phase of capital trials. 
This note will present five arguments for why Missouri should overturn 
State v. Christeson,27 the Missouri precedent stating that evidence of 
unadjudicated conduct is allowed into evidence in capital sentencing.  The first 
section will describe domestic and international views on sentencing 
procedures in capital trials and demonstrate the importance of using 
international opinions as a guide to United States’ opinions.  The second 
argument will contend that Apprendi v. New Jersey28 bars States from allowing 
unadjudicated conduct into the sentencing phase without proving that conduct 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The third argument will discuss why evidentiary 
sentencing standards should ban the prosecution from entering unadjudicated 
conduct into evidence.  The fourth argument will discuss procedural due 
process in civil cases and how it relates to the criminal cases.  This note will 
next address the current motive that some states, like Missouri, have for 
permitting the use of evidence of unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing 
and then question the soundness of that motive.  Finally, the conclusion will 
come back to the above-mentioned case of Gray v. Netherland and suggest that 
had unadjudicated evidence of criminal conduct been kept out of the 
sentencing phase, there likely would have been a different result. 
II.  INTRODUCTION TO SENTENCING PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL TRIALS 
At the outset, it is important to be familiar with the general procedural 
format of capital trials.  First, the defendant must be notified that the 
government seeks the death penalty, and aggravating factors must be presented 
to show a justification for the death sentence.29 Subsequently, in the guilt 
phase of a capital trial, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of 
the capital offense.30  If the defendant is convicted, he is provided a separate 
hearing to determine punishment, known as the sentencing phase.31 
States must “limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be 
applied,” per Furman v. Georgia.32  For this reason, most states have come up 
with a list of aggravating circumstances and the jury must find at least one for 
the death penalty to be imposed.33  The Furman requirement is “usually met 
 
 27. 131 S.W.3d 796. 
 28. 530 U.S. 584 (2000). 
 29. 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B) (2006) 
 30. 21 U.S.C. §848(i); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a)-3593(b) (2006). 
 31. 21 U.S.C. §848(i); see also  18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2006). 
 32. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972). 
 33. Even this restriction is becoming meaningless, however.  “[S]ome of the added factors 
are so general—such as if the murder is “cold, calculated and premeditated”—as to throw the 
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when the trier of fact finds at least one statutory eligibility factor at either the 
guilt phase or penalty phase.”34  The trier of fact must then decide whether the 
defendant is eligible for the death penalty.35 
Capital punishment trials occur in two phases.36  During the first phase, the 
jury deliberates on whether the prosecution has proved at least one aggravating 
factor37 beyond a reasonable doubt and must come to that conclusion 
unanimously.38  If the jury does not unanimously find the prosecution upheld 
its burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
death penalty cannot be imposed.39 
Once the jury has found an aggravating factor does exist, it continues to 
stage two.  Here, they must determine if the aggravating factors sufficiently 
outweigh the mitigating factors, or if the aggravating factors are adequate to 
validate a death sentence.40 Mitigating factors only have to be determined by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.41  Finally, “the jury by unanimous 
vote . . . shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or some other lesser 
sentence.”42 
Section 565.030.4 of the Revised Missouri Statutes43 establishes a four 
step test in order for a defendant to receive the death penalty.44 
Step 1 requires the trier of fact to find the presence of one or more statutory 
aggravating factors set out in section 565.032.2.  Step 2 requires the trier of 
fact (whether jury or judge) to find that the evidence in aggravation of 
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory 
aggravating factors, warrants imposition of the death penalty. In step 3 the jury 
is required to determine whether the evidence in mitigation outweighs the 
evidence in aggravation found in steps 1 and 2. If it does, the defendant is not 
 
class of eligible cases wide open.  And that, in turn, invites with a neon sign the kind of 
arbitrariness that the original list of aggravating factors was intended to surmount.  Today, one 
prosecutor’s death penalty case is another’s life sentence.”  Editorial, Fixing the Death Penalty, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2000, at A1 
 34. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 887 (2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. “Aggravating circumstance” or “aggravating factor” is frequently used “to refer to those 
statutory factors which determine death eligibility in satisfaction of Furman’s narrowing 
requirement.”  Id. at 889. 
 38. Id. at  887; see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(k); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). 
 40. Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 887; see also 21 U.S.C. §848(k). Some states have statutes that say 
if the mitigating factors equal the aggravating factors, then the death penalty should be imposed.  
Many states, however, are invalidating those statutes.  State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004).  
 41. 21 U.S.C. §§848(j)-(k); see also 18 U.S.C. §§3593(c)-(d). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. §848(k); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). 
 43. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2006). 
 44. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Mo. 2003). 
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eligible for death, and the jury must return a sentence of life imprisonment. 
Finally, in step 4 of section 565.030.4, the trier of fact is instructed that it must 
assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment if it decides under all 
of the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment at death.45 
In Missouri, a jury can give a life sentence notwithstanding “the weight it gave 
to aggravators and mitigators it found.”46 
As a result of the procedural system for sentencing in capital trials, a 
capital defendant has to “investigate and present a complete and effective case 
in mitigation while rebutting either or both aggravating circumstances of 
vileness and future dangerousness.”47  Because the State may present evidence 
of unadjudicated criminal conduct to prove future dangerousness, “the capital 
defendant might have the difficult task of refuting acts that no one ever proved 
he committed.”48 
III.  STATE OPINIONS VS. INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS ON UNADJUDICATED 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS 
A. Differing State Decisions in the United States 
The Supreme Court leaves many decisions up to State courts and 
legislatures.  There are some decisions that the Supreme Court directly states 
should be left up to the states.  Other decisions, however, are left for states to 
decide by default.49  For this reason, it is important, on issues that the Supreme 
Court has not decided, to look to state’s decisions throughout the country. 
The issue of unadjudicated criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of 
capital trials has not gone before the Supreme Court.  Therefore, by default, the 
states are left to formulate their own opinions.  In the United States, there are 
eight states50 that do not allow evidence of unadjudicated offenses at the 
sentencing phase of capital trials.51  There are ten states52 that allow the 
evidence to come in, but impose “strict procedural protections such as a 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in Aggravation,  
17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 322 (2005). 
 48. Id. 
 49. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 2. 
 50. Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Washington.  
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 52/01, available at  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/52-01.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter 
IACHR]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, South 
Carolina and Utah.  Id. 
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heightened standard of reliability.”53  It also must be taken into consideration 
that twelve states ban the death penalty all together, thus do not need to decide 
the issue.54 
Courts give different reasons for not allowing evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Washington found the following: 
To allow the jury which has convicted defendant of aggravated first degree 
murder to consider evidence of other crimes of which defendant has not been 
convicted is, in our opinion, unreasonably prejudicial to defendant.  A jury 
which has convicted defendant of a capital crime is unlikely fairly and 
impartially to weigh evidence of prior alleged offenses.  In effect, to allow 
such evidence is to impose upon a defendant who stands in peril of his life the 
burden of defending, before the jury that has already convicted him, new 
charges of criminal activity.  Information relating to defendant’s criminal past 
should therefore be limited to his record of convictions.55 
Additionally, in Alabama it was found that “[u]ntil the State proves him 
guilty of this charge in accordance with appropriate legal procedures [the 
defendant] is presumed innocent . . . [t]his fundamental tenet of our system of 
justice prohibits use against an individual of unproven charges in this life or 
death situation.”56 
Some courts, however, side with Missouri, and allow such evidence into 
the penalty phase.  In Virginia it was found that there was no “due process 
requirement that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant engaged in the unadjudicated criminal conduct offered as evidence 
in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.”57  Furthermore, the Court 
looked to Patterson v. New York,58 stating that “the state need not prove 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 55. State v. Bartholomew, 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982). 
 56. Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 1257 (Ala. 1979). 
 57. Walker v. Com., 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999).  There is also an interesting 
incongruity in Virginia: 
at sentencing for non-capital felonies, unadjudicated criminal conduct is inadmissible. 
However, adjudicated criminal conduct is admissible to prove, to some extent, future 
dangerousness. Nevertheless, in capital cases, where the punishment is final and more 
severe, evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is admissible.  If the Virginia 
legislature and courts are unable to see any “relationship” between unadjudicated conduct 
and the appropriate sentence in non-capital cases, it is difficult to understand how the 
legislature and courts can see such a relationship in capital cases where the potential 
punishment is infinitely more severe and final. 
Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 65-66 (1999). 
 58. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt every fact it recognizes as a circumstance affecting 
the severity of punishment.”59 
B. Missouri’s Decision to Permit Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct in the 
Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials 
In Missouri there is no “future dangerousness” statutory aggravator, 
therefore evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is considered a “non-
statutory aggravator” and is used primarily for increasing the weight of the 
prosecution’s argument.60  The rule permitting unadjudicated criminal conduct 
to be heard in the sentencing phase of capital trials in the state of Missouri was 
determined in the case of State v. Christeson: 
Evidence of a defendant’s prior unadjudicated criminal conduct is admissible 
during the penalty phase.  During the penalty phase, both the state and the 
defense may introduce any evidence pertaining to the defendant’s character, 
including evidence of the defendant’s conduct that occurred subsequent to the 
crime being adjudicated.61 
In State v. Christeson, the trial court allowed the jury to hear evidence that 
the defendant sodomized a person in order to show a “predatory pattern.”62  
This evidence did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and was 
allowed in to contradict the mitigating evidence the defense presented.63 
C. International Opinion 
1. The Importance of International Opinion in General 
Since the creation of the Unites States Constitution, Supreme Court 
Justices have looked to international opinion in deciding cases.64  Most 
recently, Justice Kennedy has taken up the practice of citing international 
opinion, causing international opinion to be more focal than ever before.65  
 
 59. Walker v. Com., 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999) (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214). 
 60. The Missouri homicide statute contains the following statutory aggravator: “The offense 
was committed by a person. . . who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions.”  
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032(2)(1) (2006).  Unadjudicated conduct and future dangerousness, 
however, are not statutory aggravators in Missouri. 
 61. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 269 (Mo. 2001). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could 
Change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050912fa_fact (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 65. “Had the practice of citing foreign sources been confined to liberal—and, in the current 
political arrangement of the Court, less influential—Justices, it would have remained a 
phenomenon primarily of academic interest. . .’When Kennedy, who’s hardly a liberal, started 
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International judges face analogous problems to those of the United States, 
therefore it is useful to look to foreign opinions.66  Furthermore, foreign judges 
are “dealing with texts that more and more protect basic human rights,” and if 
foreign problems are comparable to those of the United States, why not read 
what the foreign judges are deciding, even if only for educational purposes.67  
Finally, in an argument best stated by Justice Kennedy, “[i]f we are asking the 
rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom, it does seem to me that there 
may be some mutuality there, that other nations and other peoples can define 
and interpret freedom in a way that’s at least instructive to us.”68 
2. Trend towards Following International Opinion in Capital Punishment 
Cases 
International opinion should be specifically applied to capital punishment 
cases.  In his recent article, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the 
U.S., Richard Dieter illustrates why international opinion should and is starting 
to have an effect on capital punishment decisions in the United States.69  First,  
recently in the United States there has been an acknowledgement of the “need 
for international cooperation and respect for the laws of other democracies.” 70  
Dieter also states that “there is a broader intersection between United States 
capital punishment law and the interests of other countries.”71  Finally, 
international opinion has changed so that instead of an assortment of views on 
capital punishment among United States allies, there is now a “growing 
consensus condemning its use in general.”72 
An example of the United States using international opinion in a capital 
punishment case is in Atkins v. Virginia,73 where the Supreme Court held that 
the execution of persons with mental retardation constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.74  The opinion mentioned an amicus curiae brief by the European 
 
citing these international sources, that’s when the subject exploded in the broader political world,’ 
says Dorsen, who in 2003 founded the International Journal of Constitutional Law.”  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  This was said at a debate at American University in Response to Scalia’s statement 
that international opinion is immaterial because “we don’t have the same moral and legal 
framework as the rest of the world, and never have.”  Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S., FOREIGN 
SERVICE J., Oct. 2003, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 
17&did=806 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  Dieter cites as examples “[i]ssues of extradition, the execution of foreign nationals, 
and the prospects of military tribunals to deal with suspected foreign terrorists often put the death 
penalty and international human rights concerns in direct conflict.” Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 74. Id. at 321. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] IN THE PROSECUTOR WE TRUST? 165 
Union that banned executions of persons with mental retardation.75  “The clear 
inference of this reference was that international opinion played a role in 
determining the standards of decency as they evolved in a maturing society.” 76  
Even though only eighteen states banned executions of persons with mental 
retardation, “the Court found evidence of a consensus when these states were 
joined with many other factors, including world opinion.”77 
Most recently, the Supreme Court cited international opinion in Roper v. 
Simmons78 when it found the death penalty to be unconstitutional for 
juveniles.79  The majority opinion stated that: 
[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty. . . [i]t does not lessen our fidelity to 
the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express 
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of 
freedom.80 
The United States should follow its opinions in Atkins v. Virginia and 
Roper v. Simmons and cite to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) decision, see infra, ruling that evidence of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct should not be allowed into the sentencing phase of capital 
trials.81  In the United States, eighteen states limit the use of this evidence, in 
addition to the twelve states that ban the death penalty all together.82  When 
taken into consideration with world opinion, it is clear that the “evolving 
standards” in society83 support the disuse of this evidence. 
Even if the United States opts not to take on the issue of evidence of 
unadjudicated conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials, Missouri should 
recognize that its abolition by fellow states and international opinion indicates 
a need for its reevaluation.  As the Supreme Court is concerned with more 
pressing and complicated issues, Missouri should not look at the lack of 
adjudication of the issue as the Court being in agreement with Missouri’s 
 
 75. Id. at 316, n.21. 
 76. See Dieter, supra note 69. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 79. Id. at 575. 
 80. Id. at 578. 
 81. See IACHR, supra note 49. 
 82. Id. 
 83. In an speech given to his students in Europe, indicating the importance of society, Justice 
Kennedy stated “Here you are in Europe. . .[a]nd you might think, Gee, look at this culture, look 
at these churches, look how old everything is. But you have the oldest constitution in the world. 
We have a legal identity, and our self-definition as a nation is bound up with the 
Constitution. . .[t]here is also the constitution with a small ‘c,’ the sum total of customs and mores  
of the community. . . [t]he closer the big ‘C’ and the small ‘c,’ the better off you are as a society.” 
See Toobin, supra note 59. 
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approach.  Therefore, Missouri should follow the same logic as the Atkins and 
Roper decisions, and look to world opinion as evidence of the need to overturn 
State v. Christeson. 
3. International Structures in Place for the Protection of Human Rights 
and for the Facilitation of Implementing International Views 
i. The IACHR and Its Function 
The IACHR is a body in the inter-American structure for the “promotion 
and protection of human rights.”84  It is an independent branch of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).85  The IACHR’s “mandate is found in 
the OAS Charter and the American Convention of Human Rights.”86  The 
IACHR speaks for each of the member States87 of the OAS.88  Seven members 
of the IACHR act independently, without speaking for any individual 
country.89  “The members of the IACHR are elected by the General Assembly 
of the OAS.”90  The IACHR is a “permanent body which meets in ordinary and 
special sessions several times a year.”91  The principal function of the IACHR 
is to endorse the “observance and defense of human rights.”92 
Additionally, the IACHR’s decisions are only recommendations, and are 
not legally binding in the United States.93  While the decisions are not binding, 
the petitioners and the states often come to an agreement.94  The following 
chart shows the “total number of friendly settlement reports published”: 
 
 84. About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/ 
eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 85. Also, the OAS “brings together the countries of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen 
cooperation and advance common interests. It is the region’s premier forum for multilateral 
dialogue and concerted action.” Id.  The OAS takes on such tasks as defending democracy, 
protecting human rights, strengthening security, fostering free trade, combating illegal drugs, and 
fighting corruption.  Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The membering states of OAS are: Antiqua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadinas, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.  Id. 
 88. IACHR, available at http://www.cidh.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See IACHR, supra note 88. 
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 95 
ii. The Role of the American Declaration and Its Interplay with the 
IACHR 
“The American Declaration is an international human rights instrument 
that contains fair trial guarantees.”96  The IACHR “has the authority97 to 
entertain individual petitions alleging that OAS member states, including the 
United States, have failed to comply with their obligations under the American 
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man.”98 
While the American Declaration was not implemented as a legally binding 
treaty, the OAS Charter, of which the United States is a part, is legally 
binding.99  The IACHR has determined “that the American Declaration 
‘acquired binding force’ by means of the amendments to the OAS Charter 
adopted in 1967-68.”100 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,  OAS Res. XXX (May 2, 1948), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Gen. Ass. Res. 447, 
9th Sess., art. 20, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic15.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007). 
 99. IACHR, Resolution 3/87, Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, ¶¶ 46-49, reprinted in 
Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 294-96 (1987). 
 100. Id. 
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iii. United States v. Garza, a Case Submitted to the IACHR Concerning 
Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital 
Trials 
In United States v. Garza, Juan Raul Garza headed a drug trafficking 
enterprise.101  After setbacks from an intermittent seizure by law enforcement, 
Garza became suspicious of some of his workers tipping him off to the police, 
and had one victim killed as a forewarning to De La Fuente, the victim’s 
associate.102  He later had De La Fuente and a third associate that cooperated 
with authorities killed.103  “In February 1992, the U.S. Customs Service 
mounted a sweeping interstate offensive” and “[a]s a result of this raid, most of 
Garza’s associates were indicted and arrested.”104  Garza fled to Mexico and 
was later caught by police after trying to make a drug deal with an associate 
that was working with the authorities.105  Garza, who was one of two 
defendants, was convicted of two counts of killing in furtherance of the first 
defendant’s, Flores, continuing criminal enterprise, as well as the other drug 
offenses.106 
In the sentencing phase, the jury concluded that Garza was responsible for 
five further killings, and that Garza was a continual threat to others.107  The 
jury then “unanimously found that the aggravators sufficiently outweighed the 
mitigators to justify a sentence of death.”108  He was sentenced to death by the 
federal court in Texas for the three murders.109  Garza next filed a petition with 
the IACHR, stating the evidence of unadjudicated murders in the sentencing 
phase violated his rights.110 
iv. The IACHR Report in United States v. Garza 
Garza asserted in his petition to the IACHR that the United States violated 
1) his right to a fair trial under Article XXVIII of the American Declaration 
and 2) his right to due process of law under Article XXVI of the American 
Declaration.111  Article XVIII of the American Declaration states that “[e]very 
person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.  .  .  [t]here 
should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the 
 
 101. United States v. Garza, 63 F.3d 1342, 1351 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. Garza paid $10,000 to each person who helped in the killing of De La Fuente.  Id. at 
1352. 
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 106. Id. at 1342. 
 107. Garza, 63 F.3d at 1367. 
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courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any 
fundamental constitutional rights.”112  Article XXVI113 states that “[e]very 
person accused of an offense has the right to be given an impartial and public 
hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established in accordance with 
preexisting laws.”114 
The IACHR found that the United States violated Articles XVIII and 
XXVI of the American Declaration, in accordance with Garza’s claim.115  In 
its opinion, the IACHR recommended116 the United States look at “its laws, 
procedures, and practices to ensure that persons who are accused of capital 
crimes are tried and sentenced in accordance with the rights under the 
American Declaration, including in particular prohibiting the introduction of 
evidence of unadjudicated crimes during the sentencing phase of capital 
trials.”117 
C. Conclusion 
Clearly, the IACHR disapproves of using unadjudicated prior bad acts 
during the sentencing phase of capital trials.118  Its recommendation in Uni ted 
States vs. Garza should influence the United States in the sentencing procedure 
domain.  Additionally, Missouri should view the IACHR report and 
accordingly review its procedure of allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct 
during the sentencing phase of capital trials, and in doing so will hopefully be 
influenced to follow the lead of states like Washington and Alabama. 
 
 112. American Declaration Article XVIII, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/ 
basic2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 113. Compare with the U.S. Constitution which states that “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
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with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI., § 2. 
 114. See IACHR, supra note 49. 
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IV.  APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND RING V. ARIZONA PROHIBIT THE USE OF 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL 
TRIALS 
A. Decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona 
In New Jersey, the crime of possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
purpose is a second-degree offense.119  The punishment for such an offense is 
five to ten years in prison.120  There, however, is a second statute that states 
when a defendant commits a second-degree offense “with a purpose to 
intimidate an individual or group. . . because of race, color [or] gender[,]” the 
punishment for the crime can be enhanced to ten to twenty years.121 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant was charged with possessing a 
firearm for an unlawful purpose.122  He then pled guilty to the charge.123  
During the sentencing phase, the trial judge conducted a hearing and concluded 
that the defendant had the “purpose to intimidate” because of race.124  
Subsequently, the trial judge, without a jury, gave the defendant more than a 
ten year sentence.125 
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had the right to have the issue 
decided by a jury, rather than by judge alone.126 “Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”127  In coming to this determination, the Court recognized 
that “due process and associated jury protections extend. . .to determinations 
that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his 
sentence.”128 
This ruling was applied to death penalty cases in Ring v. Arizona. 129  In 
Ring, the jury hung in the trial phase on if Ring committed the offense of 
premeditated murder, but found him guilty of felony murder.130  In Arizona, 
Ring could only be sentenced to death if further findings by the judge in the 
 
 119. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). 
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 121. Id. 
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 124. Id. 
 125. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 484 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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sentencing hearing showed that Ring was guilty of premeditated murder.131  
The judge would therefore have to determine the existence of any statutory 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and ascertain that at least one aggravating 
factor existed and that no mitigating factor existed that effectuated a call for 
clemency.132  After determining the existence of two aggravating factors and 
no mitigating circumstance that required leniency, the trial judge sentenced 
Ring to death.133 
Ring argued on appeal that by allowing a judge to find the fact that raises 
the defendant’s maximum penalty, Arizona violated the Sixth Amendment’s 
trial by jury guarantee.134  The Arizona court rejected Ring’s constitutional 
argument, upheld the trial court’s finding of the two aggravating factors, and 
reweighed them against the mitigating factor that Ring did not have a serious 
criminal record.135  The Arizona court then affirmed the death sentence.136  
Following, Ring appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.137 
The Supreme Court found Walton v. Arizona,138 the existing precedent, 
incompatible with Apprendi, and stated that the Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence could not permit both opinions to stand.139  Subsequently, they 
overruled Walton in that it no longer allows a sentencing judge, without a jury, 
to find an aggravating factor necessary for the imposition of a death 
sentence.140  Additionally, because Arizona’s specified aggravating factors 
operate as “the functional equivalent of a greater offense,”141 the Sixth 
Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, finds those factors.142  In 
conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the statutory aggravating factor, in the 
sentencing phase, must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, 
rather than by a judge.143 
United States v. Booker,144 decided in early 2005, further clarifies 
Apprendi and Ring.  In Booker, the jury sentenced Booker to 210 to 262 
 
 131. Id.  The statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder is the death penalty, so the 
judge would have to find first degree murder because the jury only convicted Ring of felony 
murder which does not invoke the death penalty in Arizona. Id. 
 132. Id. at 592-593. 
 133. Id. at 594-595. 
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 135. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584, 596 (2002). 
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 138. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).  In Walton the court ruled that a jury did not have to find the 
existence of aggravating factors, the judge could.  Id. at 649. 
 139. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 140. Id. 
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months in prison per the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.145  The judge, at the 
sentencing hearing, instead gave Booker a thirty year sentence after finding 
additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence.146 
The circuit court held that the trial judge’s application of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, in finding additional facts and increasing Booker’s 
sentence, violated Apprendi in that it was not submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.147  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the 
Supreme Court and found that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.148  The Court relied on Blakely v. Washington,149 
which stated that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum 
he may impose without any additional findings,” in deciding that the sentence 
infringed on the Sixth Amendment.150  The Court then ordered the district 
court to sentence Booker within the range supported by the jury’s findings or 
to hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury.151 
In sum, Apprendi states that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the Sixth 
Amendment.152  Ring makes Apprendi applicable to death penalty cases, and 
states that “because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the 
functional equivalent of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that 
they be found by a jury” beyond a reasonable doubt.153  In addition it was 
noted that: 
[b]ecause most jurisdictions already mandated jury sentencing in capital cases, 
Ring’s practical impact was not immediately wide-ranging. However, Ring 
suggested that Apprendi’s term ‘statutory maximum’ meant the maximum 
sentence that could be imposed solely on the basis of facts found by the jury—
a conclusion that turned out to be one of the cornerstones of the Blakely 
Court’s analysis.154 
 
 145. Id. at 227. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 542 U.S. 296 (2004); In addressing Washington State’s determinate sentencing scheme, 
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B. Application of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona to 
Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct 
These cases are mostly applied to situations where the defendant was not 
afforded a jury to determine a factor.  When taking a closer look at the case 
language, it is clear from Ring that not only is the defendant provided a jury, 
that jury has to prove the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.155 
In U.S. v. Green, Judge Nancy Gertner, a Massachusetts U.S. District 
Judge, ties Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely together with regards to unadjudicated 
criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials.156  Judge Gertner 
states: 
Together, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely abandoned the Court’s previous focus 
on the procedural protections required when a defendant is exposed to 
punishment above the statutory maximum.  They emphasized the protections 
that must be accorded more generally to facts, including those factors 
traditionally characterized as sentencing factors, that are essential to 
punishment because they increase a defendant’s punishment even within a 
statutory sentencing range.  Plainly, prior unadjudicated crimes that the 
government offers to justify the imposition of the ultimate punishment fit 
within this category of essential factors.  Although defendants urge the Court 
to treat all nonstatutory aggravating factors alike and require that everything be 
screened, my ruling is a narrow one, limited to prior unadjudicated crimes.  
The other non-statutory factors here. . .do not raise the same constitutional 
concerns as prior unadjudicated accusations of crime apparently unrelated to 
the offense and uniquely prejudicial.157 
The court states in Apprendi that any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.158  
Each alleged unadjudicated criminal act is a “fact.”  The particular 
unadjudicated criminal act, especially in states where it is used to show the 
statutory aggravator of future dangerousness, undoubtedly contributes to the 
increase of penalty from life without parole to the death penalty; and thus, 
according to Apprendi, should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even where the evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is not used for 
purposes of finding a statutory aggravator, and used simply to supplement the 
State’s argument that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, it can still be said that the evidence is used for purposes of 
 
 155. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584. 
 156. Judge Gertner on Ring, Apprendi, and Blakely in Capital Setting, SENTENCING LAW & 
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increasing the penalty for a crime. Furthermore, as Judge Gertner points out, 
unadjudicated conduct fits within the “category of essential factors.”159 
Another case where Apprendi was applied to prior acts was State v. 
Harris.160  Here, the Oregon Supreme Court found that if a prior juvenile 
adjudication is to be used for purposes of increasing the penalty for a crime, 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial necessitates that “its existence either 
must be proven to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing 
purposes following an informed and knowing waiver.”161  If a court can go as 
far as saying that an adjudicated criminal act must be proven by a trier of fact 
to be able to increase the penalty, then surely an unadjudicated act should have 
to also be proven by a trier of fact. 
Surprisingly, however, Oregon still allows unadjudicated conduct into the 
sentencing phase of capital trials.162  In State v. Tucker,163 the court asserts that 
the state’s statute164 defining what evidence is allowed into the sentencing 
phase of trials should be interpreted broadly and allow in evidence of 
unadjudicated conduct.165  The court’s decision in Harris does not seem to 
correspond with its decision in Tucker.  The Harris case was decided in 2005, 
versus Tucker which was decided in 1993.166  If the Oregon court were to 
today apply Apprendi to Tucker, in the same way it applied Apprendi to 
Harris, unadjudicated conduct would not be allowed in the sentencing phase of 
capital trials in Oregon.  Unfortunately, many states, like Oregon, have not 
updated decisions regarding unadjudicated conduct in congruence with 
Apprendi and Ring, and should do so to avoid incongruent decisions. 
C. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Apprendi clearly bans the use of facts not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be used in increasing the penalty of a crime.167  An 
unadjudicated criminal act is undoubtedly a “fact” for Apprendi purposes.  The 
only real question lies in whether or not the fact is used for purposes of 
increasing the penalty.  In states where a statutory aggravator of future 
dangerousness exists, and the “fact” of an unadjudicated criminal act is given 
as evidence in contribution to this factor, Apprendi surely applies.  Arguably, 
the use of an unadjudicated criminal conduct (“fact”) at any time during the 
sentencing phase is for the purpose of increasing the penalty of the crime.  
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Thus, use of an unadjudicated criminal act in the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial will always violate the well established Apprendi rule. 
V.  EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AT SENTENCING SHOULD PROHIBIT THE USE OF 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL 
TRIALS 
A. Introduction 
During the early-to-mid 1900s, there was an increase in procedural 
protections for criminal defendants during the pretrial phase and the trial 
phase, but not for the sentencing phase.168  Then, in Townsend v. Burke, 169 the 
Supreme Court held that because of the due process clause the defendant’s 
sentence should be centered on accurate information.170  “Any hope that this 
decision would lead to increased procedural protections for sentencing was 
diminished in the following year, however, when the Court decided Williams v. 
New York.”171 
B. Williams v. New York 
In Williams v. New York, Williams was found by a jury to be guilty of 
murder in the first degree.172  The trial judge imposed a sentence of death after 
the jury had recommended life in prison.173  “In giving his reasons for 
imposing the death sentence the judge discussed in open court the evidence 
upon which the jury had convicted stating that this evidence had been 
considered in the light of additional information obtained through the court’s 
‘Probation Department, and through other sources.’”174 
New York law stated that before imposing a sentence, a court had to take 
into account the defendant’s “previous criminal record, any reports of mental,  
psychiatric, or physical examinations, and any other information that could aid 
the court in determining the proper treatment of the defendant.”175  During the 
sentencing phase of the trial, the court discussed what it considered in 
determining Williams death sentence.176  Among other things, the court 
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considered information that Williams had committed thirty other burglaries, 
had a “morbid sexuality,” and was a “menace to society.”177 
On appeal, Williams argued that the use of this information violated “the 
right of an individual to be given reasonable notice of charges against him and 
an opportunity to examine adverse witnesses, as guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”178  The Court found that, in the 
past, different evidentiary rules had been employed in the sentencing phase 
than in the trial phase.179  The Court stated that the reason for the discrepancy 
is that “the judge at sentencing needed a broad spectrum of information” and 
that “full access to information was necessary for a judge’s selection of the 
appropriate penalty because fashioning appropriate individualized, 
indeterminate sentences required consideration of an offender’s past life and 
habits.”180  The Court concluded that the “Due Process Clause should not be 
applied to require that evidentiary procedure at sentencing match trial 
procedure.”181 
C. Application of Williams and New Cases to Unadjudicated Criminal 
Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials 
Since Williams v. New York, several cases have concluded that, unlike the 
reasoning in Williams, the death penalty is not the same as any other 
sentence.182  Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion in Gardner v. Florida,183 
stated that the death penalty is qualitatively different than other 
punishments.184  Likewise, in Woodson v. North Carolina,185 the Court stated 
that “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”186 
As noted above, the Williams Court stated that “full access to information 
was necessary for a judge’s selection of the appropriate penalty because 
fashioning appropriate individualized, indeterminate sentences required 
consideration of an offender’s past life and habits.”187  Unlike judges, jurors 
are not “fashioning appropriate individualized. . .sentences.”188  They are not 
hearing an individual’s case, and then comparing it to other cases they have 
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heard in order to fashion an appropriate sentence, like a judge would.  In fact,  
most jurors have probably never even heard evidence of another capital 
murder.  Because of the Ring decision that states that a jury, rather than a 
judge, has to find a sentence of death, it can no longer be said that “a broad 
spectrum of information” need be given to the sentencer.  The “broad spectrum 
of information,” spoken of in Williams v. New York, only applied to a judge’s 
need, not a jury’s. 
Additionally, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. 
Lynaugh,189 demonstrates another approach to an argument relying on 
evidentiary standards.  He states: 
if a defendant has a right to have a jury find that he committed a crime before 
it uses evidence of that crime to sentence him to die, he has a right that the jury 
that makes the determination be impartial.  A jury that already has concluded 
unanimously that the defendant is a first-degree murderer cannot plausibly be 
expected to evaluate charges of other criminal conduct without bias and 
prejudice.190 
He goes on further to state that many state courts have come to this conclusion 
that the “introduction of evidence of unadjudicated offenses violates a 
defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury.”191 
D. Conclusion 
For many reasons, evidentiary standards should prevent evidence of 
unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing.  Because a jury now must 
determine the sentence in capital trials, the need for a “broad spectrum” of 
information is diminished because, unlike a judge, a jury cannot “fashion an 
appropriate sentence” based on its knowledge of other criminal defendants.  
Additionally, a jury is prejudiced by the evidence it heard during the guilt face 
of the defendant’s trial, and thus cannot listen impartially to the evidence of 
unadjudicated conduct it hears in the sentencing phase of the capital trial. 192  
Therefore, unadjudicated prior bad acts should not be allowed in capital 
sentencing. 
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VI.  A LOOK AT CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND THE INFLUENCE THEY SHOULD 
HAVE ON DECISIONS REGARDING UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN 
THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS 
A. Mathews v. Eldridge 
Under the disability insurance benefits program created in the 1956 
amendment to Title II of the Social Security Act, workers who are completely 
disabled are provided cash benefits.193  Eldridge was awarded benefits under 
this Title in 1968, but in 1972 the state agency, after obtaining reports from his 
physician and psychiatric consultant, found that his disability had 
terminated.194  Eldridge, instead of requesting reconsideration of his disability, 
brought suit contesting the constitutional soundness of the administrative 
procedures, created by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for 
evaluating if a continuing disability exists.195 
The Court recognized a development of considerations helpful in 
determining what protections are constitutionally required under the Due 
Process Clause to reduce the incidence of error on decisions affecting life, 
liberty, or property.196  The following are the three considerations that the 
Mathews Court determined should be applied: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.197 
B. Application of Civil Proceedings to Criminal Proceedings 
Per Mathews, the tenets of due process depend on a conscientious analysis 
of what is at stake.198  To guide this analysis, the three factor test has been 
implemented as a procedural safeguard in civil cases since the decision in 
Mathews.  The test should translate over to criminal proceedings as well. 
In Mathews, the problem was that of the constitutional protection of 
property.199  With unadjudicated conduct permitted in the sentencing phase of 
capital trials, the constitutional protection at issue is that of life.  It seems 
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commonsensical that life, the most valued right that a human being has, at least 
be given the same due process analysis that property200 was given in Mathews.   
If this analysis were introduced in criminal procedure, as it should be, the use 
of unadjudicated evidence in the sentencing phase of capital trials would 
probably be seen as a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual 
rights of the defendant.  The third factor, that of the government’s fiscal and 
administrative interest, could not possibly outweigh the risk of deprivation of 
the individual rights of the defendant. 
It is time that Missouri, and the rest of the nation, give criminal defendants 
who are facing death the same procedural due process as it gives a man who 
has lost disability payment.  Therefore, unadjudicated criminal conduct should 
not be allowed in the sentencing phase of capital trials because of the 
procedural safeguards of due process. 
VII.  ARGUMENT FOR PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CONDUCT IN 
THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS AND REBUTTAL TO THAT 
ARGUMENT 
A. Opposing View: Why Proponents Want to Keep Evidence of 
Unadjudicated Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials 
The main argument, inter alia, that States that continue to allow evidence 
of unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing use is that because the 
defendant gets to put forth any mitigating factor in their defense, the 
prosecution should get to put forth any aggravating factor in rebuttal.  “[I]n all 
capital cases the sentencer must be allowed to weigh the facts and 
circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence against the defendant’s 
mitigating evidence.”201  In Peterson v. Commonwealth of Virginia,202 the 
Virginia Court concluded that the unadjudicated acts of the defendant were 
admissible because, as the court interpreted, the Virginia statute allows for 
evidence of “the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and 
background of the defendant, as well as mitigating evidence.”203 
B. Rebuttal 
In a study done by William J. Bowers and Wanda D. Foglia in 2003, it was 
found that “45% of jurors failed to understand that they were allowed to 
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consider any mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.”204  
Additionally, “two-thirds of jurors failed to realize that unanimity was not 
required for findings of mitigation.”205  Also, surveys indicate that “too many 
jurors misunderstand a judge’s instructions about what evidence they can 
consider when weighing the death penalty.”206 Clearly, these findings reveal 
that a large percentage of jurors do not understand the importance of mitigating 
factors.  For this reason, the argument that a prosecutor should be allowed to 
introduce evidence of unadjudicated prior bad acts because the defendant gets 
to show mitigating evidence of his character is unfounded. 
Not only do studies show that jurors do not give proper weight to 
mitigating factors, some findings indicate that they give too much weight to 
aggravators.207  The balance of what is discussed at sentencing deliberations is 
tipped definitively in the direction of aggravating factors.208  A further study, 
done by William J. Bowers, this time with colleague Ursula Bentele, indicated 
the “guilt-related character of punishment deliberations.”209  In this survey, the 
authors looked at what topics are discussed during deliberations in capital 
sentencing proceedings; and mitigating evidence, out of all the topics, was 
discussed the least.210  The following is a recreation of the table indicating the 
results of the aforementioned study:211 
 
 204. Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1328 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Bill Rankin & Cameron McWhirter, Bar Association Seeks Halt to Georgia Execution, 
available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/0129deathpenalty.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2007). 
 207. Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is 
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1011, 1068 (2001). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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“TABLE 1: Percent of jurors reporting a great deal of discussion during 
punishment deliberations on selected topics by type of statute.” 
 
“Panel A. Topics Discussed Most: Guilt and Aggravation” 
 
 Threshold212 Weighing213 Directed214 
The defendant’s 
role or 
responsibility in 
the crime 
86.1 81.7 82.1 
The way in 
which the victim 
was killed 
73.2 71.3 62.3 
How weak or 
strong the 
evidence was 
70.7 67.7 59.0 
The defendant’s 
motive for the 
crime 
57.2 59.2 55.1 
The defendant’s 
planning or 
premeditation 
54.1 57.5 41.3 
The defendant’s 
dangerousness if 
ever back in 
society 
55.3 43.8 82.1 
 
 
 212. In this study, “Threshold” refers to states with threshold statutes.  For purposes of this 
study, in “threshold” states “juries are instructed that they may impose death once they find an 
aggravating factor and after they consider evidence in mitigation.”  See Bentele, supra note 206, 
at 1014. 
 213. In this study, “Weighing” refers to states with weighing statutes.  Id.  For purposes of 
this study, in “weighing” states juries “are told to weigh aggravating against mitigating 
circumstances.”  Id. 
 214. In this study, “Directed” refers to Texas, who has a directed statute.  For purposes of this  
study, in Texas “jurors are focused on specific factors such as the defendant’s future 
dangerousness and the deliberateness or heinousness of the crime in making their penalty 
decision.”  Id. 
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“Panel B.  Topics Discussed Least: Aspects of Mitigation.” 
 
 Threshold Weighing Directed 
The defendant’s 
background or 
upbringing 
20.5 25.5 24.7 
Drugs as a factor 
in the crime 
12.7 15.7 24.7 
What moral 
values require 
18.7 15.2 6.3 
The defendant’s 
IQ or 
intelligence 
13.1 12.0 17.9 
Alcohol as a 
factor in the 
crime 
15.2 7.3 12.2 
Mental illness as 
a factor in the 
crime 
9.9 9.2 9.2 
 
C. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the argument that any evidence should be allowed into the 
sentencing phase of capital trials, including unadjudicated prior bad acts, is 
unsubstantiated.  Not only are jurors misunderstanding the role that mitigation 
plays in their sentencing deliberations, but jurors are clearly giving too much 
credence to aggravating factors and not enough to mitigating factors.215  A 
defendant facing death cannot possibly be given a fair sentence if the factors 
that “arguably justify a death sentence” are given more weight than the 
defendant’s mitigating evidence.  Therefore, the argument that unadjudicated 
evidence be permitted in capital sentencing because “the sentencer must be 
allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death 
sentence against the defendant’s mitigating evidence,”216 is not so influential 
as to keep Missouri and other similar states from banning such evidence. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
“revenge n. 1. punishment or injury inflicted in return for what one has 
suffered; desire to inflict this; the act of retaliation. 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 887 (2006) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 110 (1982)). 
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justice n. 1. justness, fairness; the exercise of authority in the maintenance 
of right.”217 
It is time to take a close look at the real purpose behind allowing 
unadjudicated evidence into the sentencing phase of capital trials.  Is it to seek 
“revenge,” or is the prosecution in search of “justice”?  As stated, supra, 
revenge is defined as “punishment or injury inflicted in return for what one has 
suffered; desire to inflict this; the act of retaliation.”218  Justice is defined as 
“justness, fairness; the exercise of authority in the maintenance of right.”219  
Did Gray, see supra, die at the hands of the state of Virginia because the 
prosecution was exercising it’s authority in the maintenance of right, or did he 
die because the prosecution was retaliating against the death of McClelland?  
Arguably, Gray’s death was a result of the latter.  The prosecution was 
retaliating against McClelland’s death by using evidence of a crime that Gray 
had not, prior to his trial, been a suspect.  This blatant disregard for fairness 
makes Gray’s execution vengeful, not just. 
The prosecutor “is the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose 
interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”220  Even in the 1930’s, when this statement was declared 
in Berger v. U.S., there was an understanding that the prosecution’s goal was 
not to win at all cost.  The prosecution is not pitted against the defendant, with 
the only goal being to win for their client, as in a civil proceeding.  The only 
purpose for the Sorrell murders to be interjected would be to enable the 
prosecution to win, not to serve justice.221  The Sorrell murders should not 
have entered the sentencing phase because the requirement “in safeguarding 
the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state 
embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our 
civil and political institutions.”222 
It will never be known how the jury would have sentenced Gray without 
the evidence of the Sorell murders introduced in the sentencing phase of 
Gray’s trial.  At the very least, the jurors would have been less likely to 
sentence Gray to death if they had not heard the evidence.  And even if only 
one juror were to find Gray not eligible for the death penalty without the 
Sorrell murders, Gray’s life would have been saved. 
The purpose of abandoning the precedent permitting unadjudicated 
criminal conduct into the sentencing phase of capital trials is to avoid 
outcomes like in Gray, and avoid a person dying at the hands of the 
 
 217. THE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 448, 705 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 448. 
 220. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 221. Not only for Gray, but for the Sorrells who undoubtedly would not have wanted another 
human being unrelated to their deaths, die as a result of them. 
 222. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-317 (1926). 
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government for the wrong reasons.223  This argument in itself should be 
enough for Missouri to forbid evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct that 
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the sentencing phase of 
capital trials.  When taken together with domestic and international opinions, 
the rules in Apprendi and Ring, evidentiary standards at sentencing, the 
applicable civil procedure test in Mathews, and the deficient role of mitigating 
factors versus aggravating factors, evidence of unadjudicated conduct should 
not be permitted in capital sentencing in the name of “justness, fairness, and 
the exercise of authority in the maintenance of right.”224 
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